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סיכומים באנגלית

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Zion* / ציון, Vol. ב (תשנ"ב), pp. XI-XIII

Published by: [Historical Society of Israel/](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/70036221>

Accessed: 04/12/2011 08:44

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## SUMMARIES

### JUDAH AND ASSYRIA IN THE SARGONID PERIOD

by Gershon Galil (pp. 111–133)

This article reexamines the relations between the kingdom of Judah and the Assyrian empire in the Sargonid period (722–705 B.C.). Its first part reevaluates the Akkadian and the Biblical sources (especially the 'Azekah Inscription'); and its second part reconsiders the relations between Assyria and Judah, on the background of the 'Iamani affair'.

In the author's opinion the 'Azekah Inscription' (BM 82–3–23, 131 + K 6205), describes the Assyrian campaign of 712 B.C. against Ashdod and Judah. The location of Azekah 'between my la[nd] and Judah' (line 5' = *ina bi<sub>1</sub>rii'*) [*āš<sub>2</sub>-ri-ia u<sup>kur</sup>la-u-di*], may reflect only a period between 712 and 701 (Sennacherib's 3rd campaign), because (a) Ashdod was turned into an Assyrian province only after 712 (The Annals of Sargon, ll. 261–262; Die Prunkinschrift, l. 109); (b) according to Sennacherib's Annals, Ashdod was a vassal kingdom in 701 (The Chicago Prism, col. II, l. 52; col. III, l. 32); (c) there is no evidence for an Assyrian action against Philistia between 712 and 701. It is therefore clear that there is no possibility to suppose that the 'Azekah Inscription' describes Sennacherib's campaign to the west in 701 (The name of the King of Judah in the 'Azekah Inscription' is reconstructed in this article as follows: in line 11': [<sup>m</sup>][*Ha*]-*zaq-ia<sub>1</sub>-a-u*; and in line 4': [<sup>m</sup>*Ha-zaq*]-*ia-a-u*).

In the author's opinion, Judah did not join the revolt against Assyria, neither in 722–720, nor during the 'Azuri affair'. Yet it is clear that Hezekiah was involved in the conspiracy against Assyria in 713: at that time, the usurper, Iamani, seized the throne in Ashdod, and convinced his neighbors, the kings of Judah, Moab, Edom and Philistia (probably: Gaza and Ashkelon), to send 'evil words' to the king of Egypt (probably: Osorkon IV), asking him to take an active part in the conspiracy. At that time, Hezekiah (using the refusal of the king of Ekron to join Iamani?), reconquered the Judahite cities taken away from Ahaz by the Philistines; he also captured Ekron and brought troops into the city (The 'Azekah Inscription', ll. 11', 17').

In 712 Sargon's '*turtanu*' (the Assyrian commander-in-chief) led a punitive expedition against Ashdod and Judah (see also Is. 20:1). The Assyrian army conquered Ashdod and its cities, Gath (T. Šafit) and Ashdod-yam, and later invaded Judah and conquered Azekah. Afterwards Sargon's army took over Ekron and her cities, organizing the kingdoms of Ashdod and Ekron as an Assyrian province. It is not clear in which manner the Assyrians settled the territorial conflict between Judah and Ekron. In his last years Sargon restored Ashdod and Ekron to their former state as vassal kingdoms, appointing Mitinti as king of Ashdod and Padi as king of Ekron.

## THE ACTIVITY OF JEWISH ARMY-SUPPLIERS IN THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

by Anat Peri (pp. 135–174)

This article examines the activity of Jewish army-suppliers in the kingdom of Hungary following its integration into the Habsburg Empire in the first half of the eighteenth century. At that time army supply was for the most part still the responsibility of the single unit, the company or the regiment, which enjoyed an autonomous status in its contacts with suppliers. The Habsburg regime made efforts to increase its involvement in this activity. This was done through the establishment of magazines and the organization of a regular supply of products and equipment to these magazines. Towards this end long-term contracts were drawn up with army suppliers, Jews as well as others. The role of the Court Chamber and the War Council in the ongoing support of the castles and field-units in Hungary was also enhanced. Jews fitted themselves very well into this activity, and frequently were its initiators. But in the absence of a well-ordered mechanism of tax-collection, the Crown could not finance the army supply directly from its fiscus, and the traditional systems of financing were still the general rule.

The supplier, in exchange for his services, received tax-collection concessions and became a tax-contractor. He in turn passed on his obligations and concessions to sub-contractors, thus also rendering them tax-contractors of the state. The taxes, which were collected in the counties by the army suppliers, were used on the spot for the purchase of supplies, without the mediation of state authorities in the process. In this manner the most characteristic of state-activities, such as tax-collection and army-supply, were carried out through the agency of private entrepreneurs with only a minimal involvement of the Crown. While this state of affairs left much room for private enterprise, it was not devoid of significant financial risk and at times could even be life-threatening. Inasmuch as the suppliers could not count upon regular government finances, they were forced to ensure independent sources of money and credit and to bear the high risks of loans in the private market.

This situation offered opportunities for Court Jews. Their usual method was to hand over their obligations, along with their sources of income, to their factors. The sources of income might be concessions or obligations for future income, sometimes loans, but never a salary of any regular income. The factor had to support himself independently, while the 'principal Jew' helped him at most by letting him enjoy his privileges, which improved the factor's access to occupations such as trade or shopkeeping. Factors who already enjoyed a more established economic status would try to secure their current income through the leasing of custom-houses or similar sources of income. The uniqueness of the Jews was in their willingness to undertake these high risks and to fulfill their obligations through all available means, and perhaps it is here that we should seek an explanation for their extraordinary role as army suppliers. Their methods, financial or logistic, were not essentially different from

the common practice of the day in these markets; what set the Jews apart was the incredible level of risk that they were prepared to assume, with the majority of their deals based upon future incomes, and the capital at their disposal mainly credit and promises rather than real assets. The frequency of difficulties and even occasional collapse or bankruptcy among the Jewish army-suppliers is therefore not surprising. If they fell into financial difficulties they could count upon the sympathy of the Crown, but as for financial damage they were totally responsible, as is every private businessman.

The pattern of the activity of the Jewish suppliers thus indicates the gap between the centralistic pretensions of the early absolutist Habsburg regime, and its incapacity in real life. The state, which lacked an effective mechanism for collecting taxes and supplying the army, was forced to hand these 'state' activities over to private hands.

### **'BENEI-MOSHE' : THE TALE OF A SECRET ORDER**

by Yosef Goldstein (pp. 175–205)

On the 7th of Adar 1889 a secret order – '*Benei-Moshe*' – was founded in Odessa. During the eight years of its existence over two hundred members joined the group, almost all coming from the ranks of the intelligentsia of the *Hibbat Zion* movement. Many considered their membership not merely an ideological statement, but also a sign of their belonging to the *haskalah* elite of the day. This article examines the formation and development of the order, its ideology and the causes leading to its ultimate dissolution.

The central question addressed by the author is whether the group's members indeed wished to apply in a practical context the ideals and national principles of their spiritual mentor Ahad Ha-Am, or whether they perceived the order as a political vehicle for assuming influence and power. It appears that although the leaders of the order established centers in Odessa (1889–1891), Warsaw (1891–1892) and Jaffa aimed at creating institutions that would function in accordance with the cultural and educational principles of the order, these good intentions proved insufficient. The small number of projects that were established were all short-lived. Most of the members of '*Benei-Moshe*' took no real interest in the day-to-day operations of the order, considering these to be incidental. Their main thoughts focussed on belonging to a secret order and cultivating a unique self-image as advocates of the process of secularization. It was this image that led to their political success rather than any particular project or practical activity. By the mid-1890s the members of '*Benei-Moshe*' emerged as an important factor within the *Hibbat Zion* movement.

Another frequently discussed question is: What led to the disbandment of the order? At the time the founder and spiritual leader of the group – Ahad Ha-am – offered the simple solution, i.e. that the experiment was a failure. The present author takes issue with this conclusion, suggesting that in fact the order enjoyed real success. If it ultimately broke up, this was due primarily to the activity of its leaders, and in particular to the complex personality of Ahad Ha-am himself.